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 1 
Modern Empires and Nation-States 
Outline of argument 
I begin with a general definition of empire in terms of core 
and periphery. I argue that what distinguishes the first modern 
empires from pre-modern ones was that they originated in 
competition between territorial states on the European Atlantic 
seaboard for control of non-European regions, giving rise to  
empires with a national core and physically separated 
peripheries. This acquired central significance with the global 
contest for hegemony between the commercial, national 
societies of France and Britain which developed new kinds of 
imperial control. 
European overseas empire went through four broad 
phases.  
1. Informal and contested control over broad zones. 
2. From mid-19
th
 century until 1914 formal, mutually 
agreed claims of sovereignty over territorially well-
defined colonies.  
3. This was threatened after 1918 with the collapse of 
“composite” dynastic empire in Europe and fascist 
and communist challenges.  
4. The defeat of fascist imperialism presaged the end of 
European overseas formal empire, a protracted, half-
century process. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
 2 
ended the era of formal empire, replaced by a world 
order formally consisting of sovereign nation-states. 
Empires, like all state forms, display inherent tensions. 
Central is that between core and periphery. I focus on the 
specific tension in modern empire between national core and 
non-national periphery. 
There are four ways an imperial order can be undermined: 
periphery incorporation, periphery separation, periphery 
conquest, state collapse. These are ideal types; imperial decline 
combines these elements. 
I focus on the tension between imperial 
subordination/hierarchy and imperial incorporation/separation. 
In particular I consider the peculiar unsuitability of a core 
national ideology for the exercise of imperial rule and how such 
an ideology tends to be displaced by other ideologies which 
legitimise periphery subordination. I look at how imperial 
institutions generate national movements and ideologies in the 
periphery, whether pursuing incorporation or separation. 
Finally I draw some conclusions about the legacy of 
modern empire based on the end of national core/non-national 
periphery empires. 
Empire: core and periphery 
By empire briefly I mean a state consisting of a core and 
one or more peripheries. (For definitions see the opening 
 3 
chapters of (Go 2011) and (Burbank and Cooper 2010).) The 
core is governed by one modality of power and the peripheries 
by different ones ultimately located in that core. Associated with 
the coercive institutions of empire is usually a related system of 
economic exploitation and ideological power which legitimises 
imperial hierarchy and subordination. 
A key distinction between pre-modern empire and modern 
empire is the absence of a national core in the first and the 
centrality of such a core in the second. There are two counter-
arguments against this distinction: that pre-modern empires had 
national cores and that modern empires did not. Here I briefly 
address the first of these. Although I emphasise the 
commonalities of pre-modern empire in contrast to modern 
empire, we should note the huge variations between pre-modern 
empires which might be regarded as equally, if not more, 
important than the contrast I draw. 
Pre-modern empires originate from polities taking such 
forms as city-state, small kingdom or nomadic federation.
1
 
There were differences between the population of this core and 
the peripheries they conquered –of religion, language, ethnicity 
– but the core polity was not national. All empires start from a 
centre which has a specific political order and social character. 
Modern national historiography projects back that character as 
                                                 
1 Chapters 2-7 of Burbank and Cooper offer a good survey of a variety of pre-
modern empires. 
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ethno-national: Athens as Greek, China as Han. Subsequent 
national names are taken from earlier empires: Mongol, 
Frankish, Persian, Zimbabwe. However, these are modern 
meanings. Athenians were self-consciously Greek but their 
empire subordinated other Greek city states as well as extending 
elsewhere. One Chinese imperial order was named Han but 
others adopted names from other dynasties. Identifying Han as 
the dominant Chinese ethnicity is a modern ideological move, 
reinforced by demographic mobility. (Dikötter 1997) 
This claim is a variant of the general modernist argument 
about nationalism and national identity and I will not enter into 
the oft-repeated debates about this. I would just make two basic 
points. First, insofar as we can find “nation-sounding” terms 
applied to those exercising power in pre-modern imperial cores, 
taken alone that is best explained as projections from the 
national modern to the pre-national pre-modern. Second, the 
debate has moved beyond the rather crude juxtaposition of 
modernist denials against non-modernist assertions of pre-
modern nationality. Research is more about the complex 
meanings of the words and phrases encountered in pre-modern 
sources. One meaning which seems to be largely absent is that 
the whole or majority of the core population is seen to share 
some common and significant identity. However, it does appear 
that discourse connoting ethnic identity increases in frequency 
and significance from the early medieval period, and not just in 
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Europe. (For examples: (Goetz, Jamut et al. 2012); (Scales 
2012); (Webb 2016).  
This core state usually expanded through military success 
against existing empires. Athenian imperialism followed the 
defeat of Persia, Roman that of Carthage; Islam pushed against 
mutually weakening Byzantine and Sassanian power. 
Sometimes the core polity conquered an existing empire, as with 
Mongol and Manchu takeovers of Chinese imperial power. 
Sometimes it conquered non-imperial polities, as with Genghis 
Khan and his immediate successors. These combined when 
conquest of an existing empire created the springboard for a 
imperial expansion: Alexander the Great in Central Asia and 
India, Athens and the Delian League in the Peloponnese, Rome 
in Egypt, Islam in north Africa.  
Usually peripheries were land mass extensions of the core: 
China, Russia, the Aztec and Inca empires, Arab Islam, 
shortlived nomad empires. However, I include the Greek and 
Roman maritime empires of the eastern Mediterranean because 
the short distances involved, the “routine” nature of sea-borne 
transport and communications, and the connecting functions of 
islands imparted a continuous spatial quality to them. 
This continuity confronted empires with the challenge of 
maintaining a core/periphery distinction. As populations moved 
between core and periphery (for a good example, see Moon 
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1999), as new power constellations in the periphery threatened 
the core (Heather 2006), as periphery conquerors adopted core 
ways; as expanded territory led to expanded ideology: so core 
identities and institutions were undermined. Alexander adopted 
Persian, Egyptian and the customs of other conquered societies
2
; 
Qing emperors learnt mandarin Chinese and calligraphy and 
inherited Chinese bureaucracy
3
; Julius Caesar and Augustus 
deployed military power gained in periphery conquest to subdue 
the Roman civic elite, elaborating an imperial ideology (e.g., 
Virgil’s Aeneid) which transcended Rome. All these examples 
embodied a contradiction between exercising and legitimating 
imperial power from the core and doing so in the peripheries. 
Imperial cores were always in danger of losing the periphery 
through separation, assimilation, reverse conquest or 
disintegration. What sustained empire was that new empires 
succeeded old ones. Specific empires had built-in weaknesses 
but empire as a political form had long-lasting endurance. 
The rise of the modern empire: national core and non-
national periphery 
The early stages of modern European overseas empire 
displayed features unlike that of earlier imperialism. 
                                                 
2 On Alexander as Pharoah see Goddio & Masson-Berghoff, a catalogue based 
on a 2016 British Museum Exhibition.. 
3 This is conveyed in superb visual detail in Rawski, E. and J. Rawson, Eds. 
(2005). China: The Three Emperors, 1662-1795. London, Royal Academy of Arts. 
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First, the imperial core and the peripheries were separated 
by large oceans, unlike continuous land and maritime empires. 
The significance of this would diminish with population 
movement from the core, especially in zones of large-scale 
settlement such as the Americas, south Africa and Australasia. 
Advances in transportation and communication technology had 
similar effects. However, in an era of limited emigration and 
sail, confronting utterly different societies and ecologies in the 
peripheries, there was a clear demarcation between core and 
periphery.  
These varied greatly. In the Americas European 
imperialists encountered low-density populations highly 
vulnerable to “guns, germs and steel” (Diamond 1997) and 
where large-scale settlement was feasible. By late 18
th
 century 
the core/periphery distinction had been significantly eroded. By 
contrast, Asian high-density populations, sophisticated political 
arrangements and climates hostile to European settlement 
sustained the distinction, delaying and limiting the imposition of 
European rule.  
These ecological, political and social differences were 
linked to differences in imperial ideology. Ideas of race 
inequality, for example, put whites at the top but ordered other 
alleged races in a hierarchy. The same was true of civilisational 
hierarchies. The populations most easily subjugated (killed, 
enslaved, ghettoised) were placed lowest on such hierarchies.  
 8 
Second, the drive for empire came from competing 
territorial states situated on the European Atlantic seaboard. 
These states were familiar with the concept of empire but one 
based on “composite dynasties” (Bourbons, Habsburgs, 
Romanovs).
4
 Such a concept enabled Henry VIII of England and 
Wilhelm I of Prussia to claim imperial titles without territorial 
extension.
5
 
These states took on sharply demarcated territorial forms.  
(Maier 2005); see also his book length chapter ‘Leviathan 2.0: 
inventing modern statehood’ in (Rosenberg 2012).  
 The less powerful combined to prevent the more powerful from 
achieving hegemony. Meanwhile, Ottoman and Romanov 
imperial power blocked land routes to lucrative trade in Asia. 
This shifted attention westwards, in search of a seaborne route 
to Asia. 
Third: these territorial states were undergoing significant 
changes which promoted the idea of nationality. The 
Reformation broke the European wide power of the Catholic 
church, leading to state churches in the lands where 
Protestantism succeeded and increased state control over 
                                                 
4 For a series of essays on the complex ways early modern European states 
expanded, merged and split see Greengrass, M., Ed. (1991). Conquest and 
Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe. London, Edward 
Arnold. 
  
5 Bismarck denied that Prussia had conquered other German states; it had 
“unified” them. The dynastic imperial title served a national purpose. 
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churches where Catholicism prevailed. Church territorialisation 
was associated with national ideas: Luther’s call for German 
independence from the Italian Papacy; Henry VIII’s formation 
of the Church of England. These ideas were reinforced by the 
analogies Protestant reformers drew between their struggles and 
those of Old Testament Hebrews, alluding to the idea of an 
“elect nation”. The deliberate promotion of literacy in a 
standardised vernacular (“national”) language – justified by the 
Protestant insistence that the Word of God be directly available 
to the laity and not monopolised by an intermediate class of 
priests using Latin – strengthened the idea of a unique nation 
with its own religion, language and history. (Hastings 1997) 
Finally, oceanic empire was accompanied by the rise of a 
new kind of commercial society which extended well beyond 
long-distance, high-value trade. The slave trade, plantations for 
the mass production of sugar, cotton and tobacco: these had 
profound implications for the competing imperial cores with the 
emergence of new groups (merchants, manufacturers, bankers, 
agrarian capitalists) pressing governments to be more responsive 
to their concerns. (For an overview (Benjamin 2009).  
As a consequence these territorial states –in different ways 
and at different paces - “nationalised”. The proliferation and 
extension of political society to new interest groups and 
religious concerns generated institutions and practices 
(parliaments, parties, political media, elections) extending 
 10 
beyond the privileged hierarchies of ancien regime society. It 
encouraged the rise of political discourse deploying terms like 
“the people” and “national interest”. 
This culminated in the Anglo-French struggle for global 
hegemony, ended with the defeat of Napoleon. By the time of 
the Seven Years War (1756-63) this struggle was conducted in 
north America, south Asia, the Mediterranean, central Europe as 
well as directly between the two countries. The Napoleonic wars 
extended these theatres of war to Russia, Egypt and south-east 
Europe. France and Britain allied with other states (sometimes 
deploying coercion or subsidy) and recruited soldiers and sailors 
from Native American tribes, Indian princedoms, and central 
European rulers.(Anderson 2000) 
The discourse and organisation of conflict nationalised in 
both countries, directed against the other and used in domestic 
politics.  
Thus the 1688 “Glorious Revolution” was intended by its 
English elite leaders to limit monarchical power and combat 
Catholic threats, and by its foreign beneficiary, William of 
Orange, to strengthen the alliance against France. The first great 
wars against France (the Nine Years War [1689-97] and the War 
of Spanish Succession [1701-14]) saw organised party conflict, 
articulated by pamphleteers like Defoe and Swift, and the 
founding of the Bank of England which bound the interests of 
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an extensive and varied “people of the middling sort” to the 
state. (Brewer 1989) 
Following the 1707 Union of England and Scotland and by 
the time of the Seven Years War, the national idea had taken on 
a popular Protestant, British and global form. (Colley 1992) 
Political opponents accused each other of betraying the national 
interest. Contested elections based on an expanding electorate 
shaped a national polity. British symbols and ceremonies, 
literature, music and painting became central components of a 
national culture.
6
 By the time of the Napoleonic wars this had 
become popular and intense, embodied vividly in the paintings 
and cartoons of artists such as Hogarth and Gilray. 
One finds a parallel if different trend in France. By mid-
18
th
 century political conflict extended beyond the court and, 
although usually expressed within a monarchical and Catholic 
frame, used the national idea to promote different conceptions of 
policy and organisation. Crown officials seeking to reform 
inadequate taxation systems allied with publicists to criticise 
“selfish” privileges such as noble or provincial fiscal 
exemptions and the blocking powers of parlements. The crown 
was portrayed as representing the interests of the nation, 
meaning the whole society of France. Conversely, opponents of 
                                                 
6
 Ironically, the first great national composer, “Mr Handel” was a German, “Herr Händel”. His 
oratoria ‘Judas Maccabeus”, written to celebrate the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1745, depicted 
the Duke of Cumberland, the commander of the British army, as the Jewish leader of resistance to 
Roman oppression. The analogy might seem far-fetched but it struck a chord with its large and 
socially varied London audiences. 
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the crown depicted these reform efforts as aiming to re-establish 
royal absolutism by destroying the “liberties of the nation”. 
However, unlike in Britain, this did not merely intensify by the 
end of the century but led to a revolution which destroyed both 
reforming monarchy and privileged institutions. The result was 
a more intense and popular nationalism embodied first in the 
Jacobin movement and the revolutionary armies of the early 
1790s and then in Napoleon and the formation of a continuous, 
if short-lived land empire. (Bell 2001) 
As domestic politics nationalised, so did these two 
countries deploy national arguments against each other. Hogarth 
and Gilray were amongst those, for example, who presented 
stereotypes of well-fed John Bull against the starveling Gallic 
cock. Yet such stereotypes also support the view that 
nationalisms resemble and imitate each other, even while 
insisting on uniqueness: the “narcissism of small differences”. A 
recent exhibition at the British Museum on caricatures of 
Napoleon displays this in detail. The positive images of 
Napoleon were as likely to be drawn by British as by French 
artists while the hostile stereotypes of Napoleon resembled 
those of British figures such as Charles James Fox and the 
Prince-Regent. (Clayton and O'Connell 2015) This made it easy 
for French critics to draw on idealised models of British politics 
(Montesquieu, Voltaire) and for British radicals and liberals to 
do the same with Jacobins or Napoleon (Paine, Hazlitt).  This 
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shared European elite culture was accentuated by Napoleon’s 
appropriation of imperial imagery, one which was in turn 
imitated by “traditional” dynasties.
7
  
However, the picture was different in the imperial 
peripheries. Even specific wars had different names in different 
parts of the world.
8
 In part this reflected the local concerns of 
allies. However, it also expressed the need for France and 
Britain to maintain a distinction between national ideas 
appropriate to the politics of the core and other ideas more 
suitable for exercising power in the periphery. So within Europe 
Britain argued it was seeking to prevent the dynasties – France 
above all but also Austria and Russia - crushing the freedoms of 
others, especially Protestant Germans. The principal German 
powers – Austria and especially Prussia –elaborated their 
national arguments, though these had nothing of the popular 
resonance of such arguments in France and Britain. (For a brief 
introduction see the chapters by Whaley and Clark in (Breuilly 
2001) 
In India such ideological argument was less important, 
partly because British interests were represented by a trading 
company, the East India Company, widely regarded as corrupt 
and indeed a threat to British liberties and political culture. 
                                                 
7
 Francis, Holy Roman Emperor, adopted an hereditary imperial title shortly after Napoleon 
declared himself emperor. Later the department in Vienna concerned with imperial ritual modelled 
itself on the practices of the French Second Empire, only shifting to the British model after Napoleon 
III’s defeat and the adoption by Queen Victoria of the title Empress of India. 
8
 The Seven Years War was in India the Third Carnatic War, the Third Silesian War in the 
German lands, the French and Indian Wars in North America. 
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Edmund Burke placed this concern within a broader framework 
as he justified the impeachment of Warren Hastings by outlining 
a principled justification of imperial rule based on the idea of 
civilisation. Furthermore, the idea that one could “conquer” 
India, let alone China, was understandably incredible at the 
time.
9
  
However, for my central argument concerning the need to 
separate core and periphery political ideologies and practices 
from each other, the most interesting case is north America. By 
late 18
th
 century overseas settlement had blurred the distinction. 
As Britain expelled France from north America, so arose the 
first distinctively modern imperial crisis. In the next section I 
will compare it to that of the Napoleonic empire. 
The crises and contradictions of modern empire: 
ideology and politics 
British empire (the term was used in the 18
th
 century for 
overseas territories under British rule: see chapter 1 of Go) was 
based on physical separation. A major problem Britain had in 
exercising power in North America and South Asia was the time 
it took for sailing ships to reach these peripheries with soldiers, 
administrators or instructions, then to monitor events and adapt 
                                                 
9 (This is the central argument of Wilson, J. (2016). India Conquered: Raj and 
the Chaos of Empire. London, Simon and Schuster. 
 . The “equality” of European and non-European “encounters” was 
also strongly conveyed in a Royal Academy exhibition of 2004 for which see Jackson, 
A. and A. Jaffer, Eds. (2004). Encounters: the meeting of Asia and Europe, 1500-1800. 
London, The Royal Academy. 
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policy, especially in the face of a rapidly changing crisis. 
(Bunker 2015) It was important to devise arrangements which 
bound local agents to the core. The most reliable dependency 
rested on mutual interest. Plantation owners produced for the 
British market and relied on British naval protection. The settler, 
predominantly farming societies also produced goods for the 
British market. Especially when threatened by France or Native 
Americans, settlers happily accepted British rule. 
What also sustained imperial power was that the settlers 
regarded themselves as British – by race, ethnicity, religion, 
language and culture. They were accorded a good deal of self-
government – as much out of necessity as policy – but this was 
highly localised. There was no significant sense of “American” 
identity to interpose between that of the individual colonies or 
the British connection. 
10
 
However, this undermined any identity distinction 
between core and periphery. British settlers expected to be 
treated like other British subjects. When the French threat had 
been eliminated with the end of the Seven Years War but the 
imperial core insisted on reforms which ensured that settlers 
contributed more to the costs of government, there was 
                                                 
10 See Don Doyle & Eric Van Young, ‘Independence and Nationalism in the 
Americas’ in Breuilly, J., Ed. (2013). The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
Nationalism. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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increasing resistance from settlers. They were able to use their 
existing institutions and the argument of equal treatment. 
As tension grew this had two consequences in terms of 
identity and exercise of power. Increasingly the separate 
colonies coordinated their resistance to the imperial core. 
Institutionalising conflict brought in its wake new identity 
claims.
 11
 Both the imperial core and the periphery began using  
language setting Britain against the thirteen colonies as 
equivalent opponents. The British were caricatured by drawing 
attention to features absent from the colonies: privileged 
aristocracy, established church. These were linked to an 
hereditary monarchy which became the major target of 
criticism. The increasingly positive complement was social and 
political equality, freedom of (Christian) religion and 
republicanism. Meanwhile in Britain these claims were mocked. 
When colonists issued statements about the equality of all men, 
British critics inquired about Native Americans and Afro-
Americans. 
Thus conflicting claims about political identity and forms 
of government, combined with the inability of the core to 
maintain control, quickly gave rise to new institutions in the 
                                                 
11 I cannot explore the important argument that political identity can be 
rapidly produced from a quite small stock of ideas and coordinated actions. Men 
from New England and Virginia were very different and many first met in 
Philadelphia to act in common against Britain. The same story is repeated in many 
other cases of political opposition, for example the German National Assembly of 
1848-49 and the Indian National Congress. 
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periphery which subsequently projected a national identity. 
Finally, the basic shared values in Britain and the colonies ruled 
out any other imperial ideology (Christianity, race, language, 
culture) to justify continued British domination, except for 
monarchical claims which were already in dispute in the core 
itself. 
The American revolution was not nationalist; rather the 
coordinated resistance itself generated increasingly national 
sentiments to set against British imperial ideology. This 
distinction between nationalism as explicit ideology and 
national identity as an aspect of institutional growth can be 
further explored by considering the short-lived Napoleonic 
Empire. 
This was a continuous land empire, in that sense 
traditional. However, it was indelibly associated with the utterly 
non-traditional figure of Napoleon. His justifications for 
exercising power were multiple and contradictory.  
As a child of the revolution he proclaimed the extension of 
its values beyond France. Peasants were emancipated, the 
French Civil Code introduced, hereditary nobility abolished, 
empire justified in the name of  enlightenment and progress. 
Implication: the less civilised periphery must remain under the 
rule of the advanced core, but only for the time being. 
 18 
However, his imperial coronation, with the Pope standing 
by (though Napoleon crowned himself) conveyed the image of a 
latter-day Charlemagne. This was institutionalised through 
Napoleon’s creation of an imperial nobility financed by land 
grants, making kings of relatives and loyal allies, marrying the 
daughter of the Austrian Emperor  and conferring the title of 
‘King of the Romans” upon the son of that marriage. Yet 
Napoleon was acutely aware that his origins, rise to power, and 
justification of inequality by merit not hereditary privilege 
meant he could never become part of an ancien regime world, 
let alone framed in the archaic terms of the Frankish empire.  
Above all, he was a conqueror, the genius soldier of la 
grande nation bringing other parts of Europe under his sword.  
We will never know if these contradictions in imperial 
ideology could have been resolved by survival of that empire 
beyond Napoleon’s short-lived rule. What we do know is that 
the mechanics of empire did not map on to a national 
core/foreign periphery structure.  
Michael Broers has distinguished between “inner” and 
“outer” Empire. It is a simple yet powerful distinction. By inner 
empire Broers means what I have called “core”, in that these 
territories are ruled by one set of institutions, mainly 
administrative. Outer empire can be regarded as periphery, ruled 
in other ways, usually coercive, often directly military. What is 
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striking is that for Broers inner and outer empire do not map on 
to France and non-France. Britanny and the Vendée are part of 
the outer empire. Northern Italy, Belgium, Rhenish Germany 
and the Hanseatic cities are part of the inner empire. That we 
find this striking shows how much we think of modern empire 
in terms of national core and non-national periphery. (Broers 
1996, Broers 2003, Broers 2016) 
This distinction can be related to Michael Mann’s contrast 
between infrastructural and despotic power. (Mann 1986) In the 
non-French inner empire are local elites fluent in French who 
regard Napoleon and the modes of rule and associated social 
arrangements he brings as preferable to their previous rulers. In 
turn Napoleon and his imperial elite regard these people as 
“civilised”, men who can be entrusted with posts such prefect 
and mayor. Some areas are incorporated directly into France as 
new departments; elsewhere local rulers are confirmed in power 
and energetically introduce French-style reforms. In terms of 
Mann’s distinction, the state increasingly penetrates into all 
spheres of life, for example with the Code Civile (tellingly 
known as the Code Napoleon) reshaping property transactions. 
By contrast despotic power takes the form of a “capstone” 
state imposed on top of existing periphery institutions.
12
 If 
imperial power gets beyond military occupation, it does so by 
                                                 
12 This distinction links closely to that between “direct” and “indirect” rule. 
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making deals with local elites to suppress violent resistance and 
provide a limited range of goods such as taxes and soldiers. 
This is an ideal typical distinction. “Real” empire was 
more complicated. In the satellite kingdom of Westphalia, set up 
as a “model” state to showcase the benefits of modern French 
ways, reforms were undermined in two ways. First, local elites 
did so subtly by putting old wine into new bottles. Peasant 
emancipation depended on key legal definitions. An extensive 
definition of property rights and a narrow one of privilege 
prevented dependent peasants becoming independent 
landowners.  
Second, the imperial regime did not follow through the 
logic of reform. Napoleon appropriated large estates in 
Westphalia to endow his imperial nobility. Meanwhile, 
continuous warfare meant continuing extraction of men, money 
and materials, ensuring deep unpopularity. Only for a few years 
(roughly 1805-1812) could the inner empire enjoy peaceful 
times as war was fought far away and was not too burdensome. 
(Breuilly 2003) 
The distinction between despotic and infrastructural power 
expresses a key difference between non-modern and modern 
state. What is interesting in the Napoleonic case is that this is 
not a national/non-national contrast and that modernity, by 
extending the remit of the state into everyday life, required 
 21 
legitimation beyond the original core. One is forced either to 
extend “national” legitimation (white settlers in North America 
are as British as the inhabitants of Great Britain) or replace it 
with another (France as bearer of progress, enlightenment, 
modernity). 
I return to the distinction between modern forms of 
integration, national or non-national, and the modern ideology 
of nationalism. It is often claimed that nationalism began in 
Europe at the time of Napoleon.
13
 In terms of intellectual history 
there is much to be said for this. The Addresses to the German 
Nation of philosopher Fichte, based on lectures given in Berlin 
under French occupation, express authentic nationalist doctrine. 
However, at elite level the main responses to Napoleon were 
statist – whether the choice was collaboration or resistance 
(themselves options taken according to calculations about the 
balance of power). At popular level one can better explain 
responses to Napoleon in terms of habits of obedience or direct 
reactions to the opportunities and burdens his conquest imposed. 
By 1812-13 the costs far outweighed the benefits and state elites 
had concluded combined resistance was the best option. 
“Nationalism” was a rhetoric overlaying these collective values 
and actions. Until and unless imperial rule had undermined pre-
                                                 
13 Most striking is the opening sentence of Kedourie’s book Nationalism 
(1960): “Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.” [1] 
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modern social and political arrangements, this is what a 
modernist interpretation of nationalism would expect.
14
 
The American War of Independence and the responses to 
Napoleonic empire demonstrate two ways imperial rule worked. 
Where rule from the centre was infrastructural, it undermined 
core-periphery distinctions and led to short-lived incorporation 
in Napoleon’s inner empire and legitimation based on progress 
instead of nationality, or to longer-run incorporation in the 
thirteen colonies in which progress and Britishness were fused. 
When imperial rule collapsed, in the Napoleonic case it was not 
in the face of nationalist resistance but a powerful coalition of 
states. In North America, by contrast, breakdown quickly 
stimulated a counter-national movement, though one which 
initially found it difficult to formulate a nationalist ideology. 
For a more sustained core/periphery relationship we can 
turn to Britain’s “second empire’, the one she was acquiring in 
south Asia while losing her first one in North America.
15
 Unlike 
Napoleonic empire this was rule over a far distant periphery.
16
 
                                                 
14 I developed the argument in a general way for modern Germany in 
Breuilly, J. (1997). The national idea in modern German history. German History 
since 1800. M. Fulbrook. London, Edward Arnold. 
  
15 This is a crude distinction as there were many other areas of British 
imperial activity in the Americas. For an illuminating analysis utilising the distinction 
see Marshall, P. (2005). The making and unmaking of empires: Britain, India, and 
America c.1750-1783. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 . 
16 “Far distant” is not just actual distance but relative to existing forms of 
communication and transportation. 
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Unlike the thirteen colonies this was rule over a very different 
society, or complex collection of societies, with high population 
density and elaborate political orders. 
At first there was no claim of “national” superiority.
17
 At 
best any claim was couched in civilisational terms. However, 
even that was qualified by admiration for “ancient” civilisations 
and religions.
18
 William Dalrymple has argued that many East 
India Company officials in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries 
easily affected Indian dress and customs and married Muslim 
women. (Dalrymple 2004) 
Yet as the EIC took more direct control of ever larger 
territories they came more sharply to distinguish ruler from 
ruled. Civilisational claims were made, for example justifying 
efforts to abolish “barbaric” practices such as suttee (burning a 
widow on her deceased husband’s funeral pyre). This was 
related to shifts in some regions to “infra-structural” rule, for 
example in efforts to change land tenure systems in Bengal with 
the so-called Permanent Settlement. In addition, Partha 
Chatterjee has criticised Dalrymple for underestimating 
straightforward white racism.(Chatterjee 2012) 
                                                 
17 In 1800 European powers rightly considered themselves to have no clear 
military advantage over many Asian states, especially those that imported modern 
technology and exploited conflicts between the European states. Mehemet Ali in 
Egypt and Tippu Tipp in Mysore are cases in point. 
18 The work of William Jones in India suggesting that all Indo-European 
languages had a common Aryan root had such a tendency. 
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The 1857 rising brought EIC rule to an end but had 
ambiguous consequences. It led to a rejection of the 
“civilisational” approach of Thomas Macaulay who envisaged 
forming an Anglo-Indian elite to introduce modernity to India. 
The Legal Member of the Viceroy’s Council (the institution 
designed to exercise formal imperial rule from 1858), Henry 
Maine, concluded that it was precisely the interference with 
traditional ways which had sparked the 1857 uprising. He 
elaborated a modern doctrine of “indirect rule” based on 
codifying and respecting traditional law.(Mantena 2009) This 
coincided with a renewed emphasis on the gulf between whites 
and natives – based on ideologies of race, civilisation and 
militant Christianity. This was reinforced by the arrival of 
increased numbers of women from Britain who had no wish to 
see British men marrying local women. (Dalrymple 2006) 
Yet this was an unstable situation because indirect rule and 
clear separation was undermined by the imperative of imperial 
exploitation (or “development”, to adopt the later euphemism). 
That produced modern indigenous elites (there simply were not 
enough whites to do all the jobs modern empire required) and 
infrastructural rule. The two different worlds could live for a 
while side by side: modern and direct in the major towns; pre-
modern and indirect in large areas of traditional peasant 
agriculture, but tensions grew. 
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The result, as in Napoleon’s inner empire and Britain’s 
settler colonies, was to produce indigenous elites which sought 
modern incorporation. The preferred route was based on 
modernity and progress detached from nationality; this was the 
choice of the early Indian National Congress. A second route, 
not very well explored because firmly rejected by the British, 
was what John Darwin has called “imperial ethnicity”.(Darwin 
2010) For obvious reasons this was more significant in British 
settlement colonies such as Canada, Australia and South Africa.  
The third route was resistance and that, especially with 
modern indigenous elites, increasingly expressed itself as 
nationalism. Such nationalism could draw on a rich  legacy of 
civilisational and religious difference, though integrating that 
into a coherent national idea was a formidable challenge.  
These problems were compounded by the breakdown of 
British hegemony in the later nineteenth century. The direct 
competition for empire (i.e., leaving aside the violence inflicted 
in the peripheries) between the major European powers as well 
as the USA and Japan was relatively non-violent, marked by 
agreement and cooperation rather than conflict. In some cases, 
where formal rule seemed too difficult, notably China, the major 
powers combined to crush large-scale resistance whilst 
“preserving” the Qing dynasty.
19
 In other cases, where formal 
                                                 
19 Though it did not last long after the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion 
with a republic declared in 1911. 
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rule appeared feasible, it was often achieved by treaty, as at the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-85. This accounts for the rapid 
conversion of informal into formal empire: in the last quarter of 
the century half of Africa was “switched” from one to the other. 
Yet this was superficial. Modes of imperial rule varied 
hugely, between and within imperial powers, having little to do 
with the formal status of that rule. However, all were 
increasingly defined against each other as “British”, “French”, 
“Belgian”, “Dutch”, “Russian”, “Japanese”, “American”. We 
have arrived at a world of empires formally structured around 
national cores and non-national peripheries. It was extremely 
short-lived.  
The end of modern empire 
The first world war marked a watershed for dynastic, 
continuous empires in east-central Europe and the Middle East 
and modern overseas empires. These took two different forms. 
Defeat in inter-imperial war led to the collapse  of the 
Romanov, Habsburg, Ottoman and Hohenzollern empires. 
However, there were instructive differences which I link to 
distinctions between national and non-national, despotic and 
infrastructural power.
20
 
                                                 
20 For an introduction to the events covered in the following paragraphs see 
the chapters on the Habsburg and Ottoman, Romanov and Soviet empires, and the 
Middle East by Hroch, Weeks and Roshwald respectively in Breuilly, J., Ed. (2013). 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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The Romanov and Ottoman empires most closely fit the 
non-national and despotic type. Legitimations of rule were 
dynastic and religious (Russian Orthodoxy, Islam). In the 
decades before 1914 there were efforts to modernise and 
nationalise empire which stimulated counter-nationalist 
responses, both from modern elites where reforms had taken 
hold and broader populations reacting against Russification and 
Turkification. However, these were limited unless able to build 
on more enduring divisions such as that between Polish 
Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy, Greek Orthodoxy and 
Islam. 
Instead pressure to separate into “national” units came 
primarily from outside, especially the USA and the Bolsheviks. 
In December 1917 Lenin challenged the western allies to 
abandon secret war aims (revealed in agreements with Tsarist 
Russia published by the Bolsheviks). Within two days of 
reading the English text of a speech by Trotsky calling for 
“national liberation” across the world, Woodrow Wilson 
delivered his “Fourteen Points” speech. That speech did not use 
the term “national self-determination” but Wilson did so 
publicly within a month. The combined, if conflicting pressures 
from the Soviet Union and the USA compelled France and 
Britain to pay lip service to such ideas which shaped the post-
war settlement. 
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In the Ottoman empire there was no significant nationalist 
movement or sentiment in the Arab peripheries where France 
and Britian harboured imperial ambitions, while the Anatolian 
core was multi-ethnic, albeit with a Muslim Turkish majority. In 
the Arab provinces this led to an alliance between France, 
Britain and traditional Arab leaders prepared to use nationalist 
language. A compromise between national independence and 
colonial subordination was found in the language of 
“mandates”, territories ruled “in trust” by France and Britain 
with the prospect of independence when sufficiently 
“advanced”. Empire was no longer justified as a permanent 
mode of rule. 
In Anatolia the western allies sought advantages in 
alliance with non-Turkish forces, in particular Greek 
nationalists. This failed in the face of fierce Turkish nationalism, 
a case of an imperial, non-national core rapidly converting into a 
powerful nationalist movement, building on its organised 
coercive resources. This produced the only “real” nation-state 
out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, aware of the 
need to modernise rapidly, rejected its Ottoman heritage for 
modernising secular nationalism. Nationalism in the Arab 
territories by contrast developed as a consequence of the post-
war settlement and belongs to the later story of general 
decolonisation. 
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As for the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks adopted the view 
that there were nations as well as classes and organised the new 
state along national lines.(Martin 2001) They continued to 
agitate for national liberation as part of the struggle against 
capitalist empires. 
The Habsburg Empire was more modern, based on 
infrastructual power, especially in the western half.(Deàk 2015) 
This had promoted movements with well-developed nationalist 
ideology, elite leadership and popular support, although before 
1914 these did not demand nation-states but various kinds of 
national autonomy within a multi-national state.
21
 
The defeat of the empire and Wilson’s call for national 
self-determination rapidly converted these demands into full-
blown nationalism. They could be uneasily combined with 
irredentist claims by formerly independent states of “co-ethnics” 
carved out of Ottoman Europe (Serbia and the South Slav idea 
which extended to Habsburg Croats and Slovenes; Romania and 
the Romanian national idea which took in Habsburg 
Transylvania). 
The Hohenzollern empire is very different; this was a 
modern nation-state: Germany. Its imperial name derived from a 
dynasty, not a core/periphery structure, and it had overseas 
possessions of modest proportions compared to its European 
                                                 
21 Such demands took various forms: limited territorial autonomy, federalism 
and, in the pioneering ideas of the Austro-Marxists, “national cultural autonomy”. 
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opponents.
22
 Despite its dynastic form rapid modernisation had 
promoted strong and popular national identity, mainly critical of 
the dynastic regime as non-national. The experiences of war, 
defeat and the loss of “non-German” territories (Alsace-
Lorraine, Schleswig, “Polish” lands) intensified such identity. 
The story of how these various forms of imperial collapse 
led to the “nation-state” map of central Europe has often been 
told. (For the diplomacy see (Macmillan 2003).) What is less 
analysed is the nationalism involved. I have suggested that we 
relate nationalism to imperial modernity, rather than the usual 
focus on ethnic composition and diplomacy. The degree of 
modernity relates to how far empires exhibited a national core 
ruling non-national peripheries or some other imperial structure.  
This provides a key for analysing post-war nationalism in 
central Europe. The ex-Habsburg parts of Yugoslavia had 
developed strong Slovene and Croatian cultural nationalism but 
not political movements seeking state power. By contrast the 
Serb core – a state formed from the early breakdown of pre-
modern Ottoman power in the Balkans – displayed primarily 
statist ideology and limited popular national sentiment. 
However, it had produced a political elite which organised a 
state and a powerful army, especially during the Balkan wars. 
                                                 
22 Prescient nationalists like Max Weber opposed direct imperial expansion in 
central Europe precisely on the grounds that this would destroy the national identity 
of the core. Informal hegemony in Europe and overseas empire were the preferred 
ways to preserve an empire with national core and non-national peripheries. 
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The major tensions in Yugoslavia, an idea advocated by French 
and British intellectuals at Versailles and implemented by the 
Allies, ensued from this difficult combination of national 
movements. (Drapac 2010) One can analyse Czech/Slovak or 
Transylania/”old” Romania combinations in a similar way, as 
well as the problems of a Poland composed of ex-Hohenzollern, 
ex-Habsburg and ex-Romanov societies.  
The overall outcome was a central Europe of different 
polities with national names (likewise the non-Russian Soviet 
republics), formally vested with sovereignty and accorded 
official recognition through membership of the League of 
Nations. This entailed disavowal of empire, its replacement by 
the normative target of a world of nation-states and a formula 
for forming new nation-states. The imperial powers subscribed 
to this new rhetoric while retaining ways of legitimating 
continued imperial power. 
European overseas empire expanded after 1918 but had 
lost almost all legitimation other than holding “in trust” 
territories not yet “ready” for independence. That legitimation 
was framed as hierarchical, civilisational or racial ideology. The 
populations of central Europe were differentiated by ethnicity, 
not race, with the implication that these white nations were 
ready for independence.
23
 Asians were seen as higher up the 
                                                 
23 Wilson had doubts as to whether Albania was yet fit for a state of its own. 
Allied delegates at the Versailles Conference expressed derogatory opinions about 
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race ladder than black Africans and they in turn above 
“aboriginal” populations in the Pacific islands and Australasia. 
Nevertheless, as Secretary of State Henry Lansing had observed 
when objecting to Wilson’s term “national self-determination”, 
a Pandora’s Box had been opened. There was a global flurry of 
demands for national independence ranging from Ireland (soon 
successful) to Egypt to Indochina, China and the Dutch East 
Indies.(Manela 2007) Even if these were repressed one could 
not destroy the language of national liberation increasingly used 
by colonial elites against empire.  
However, it was not clear what nationalists meant by 
national liberation. We can distinguish between territorial and 
pan nationalist ideas. In central Europe the solution had been to 
identify specific ethnic groups and to give those deemed 
dominant in certain territories a state of their own, albeit also 
creating the problem of newly designated and resentful “national 
minorities”. 
24
 
However, elsewhere pan-movements appeared more 
credible because territorial claims were difficult to formulate 
and could prove divisive, while imperial power appeared 
invincible. Pan movements have often been deemed “failures” 
but this is a retrospective projection from our knowledge that 
                                                                                                                                           
different nationalities, even if these were generally occasioned by irritation at the  
behaviour of nationalists claiming to speak for those nations. 
24 Indeed, the Versailles settlement bound successor states (but only them) 
to respect the “rights” of specified “national minorities”. 
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European decolonisation was based on precisely delineated 
colonial territories. In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries pan-
nationalism appeared a more appropriate response to the global 
dominance of “white” empire.(Lake and Reynolds 2008) Such 
movements had been inspired by the rise of Japan, especially 
following its military defeat of Russia in 1904-5. Pan-
movements, framing broad racial or religious rather than 
narrowly ethnic identity claims, accepted the categories used to 
legitimise white or Christian domination but rejected their 
hierarchical ordering. Black, brown and yellow was equal to 
white; Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism to Christianity; Asian, 
African, Arab to European.  Pan-nationalists recognised that for 
the foreseeable future imperial power could not be contested 
politically or militarily. It was necessary first to challenge 
imperial culture and ideology. 
This inverted ideological claims. The imperial powers, 
retreating from hierarchical orderings between core and 
periphery and unable to insulate the political language of core 
from periphery in this “global world”, fell back on the 
paternalist language of “trusts” and “mandates”, while it was the 
peripheries that explicitly invoked national categories. 
There were alternatives. One was fascism. Fascist 
imperialism was directed against the current imperial powers 
and revived the language of hierarchy, most explicit in the race 
ideology of the Third Reich but also encountered in Italian 
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expansion into North Africa and Japan into Korea, China and 
Indochina. Yet these empires, like all empires, needed periphery 
collaborators as in China, the Dutch East Indies and occupied 
western Europe. Where race ideology was practised (North 
Africa, Eastern Europe), self-sustaining imperial rule was 
undermined. These empires were fortunately short-lived (in part 
because of this self-destructive feature) and we will never know 
whether they could have established durable imperial rule under 
conditions of modernity. 
The other challenge was communism. However, as we 
have seen, the Bolsheviks did not regard nationality as a form of 
false consciousness but as an objective social category which 
could not be ordered hierarchically and they preached world-
wide national liberation.
25
 This was put into practical form 
through support not only of communist parties but also 
nationalist ones, most notably in China in the 1920s and early 
1930s. The ideal ally, however, was a communist party leading 
the struggle for national liberation against capitalist empire. 
                                                 
25 The “escape clause” was that the degree and type of national 
independence was made dependent on the function it served in the route to a 
communist world. For the difference between Lenin and Wilson on national 
independence see Knudsen, R. A. (2013). Moments of Self-determination: The 
Concept of ‘Self- determination’ and the Idea of Freedom in 20th- and 21st- Century 
International Discourse. International History, London School of Economics. PhD. 
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The end and legacy of modern empire 
It was territorial nationalism, not pan-nationalism, which 
eventually “succeeded”, if by success we mean the etablishment 
of a sovereign nation-state accepted as a member of the United 
Nations.. 
Again much has been written on this protracted process 
(Lebanon was granted independence in 1943, Zimbabwe in 
1979.) Again, I focus on how modernity and the core-periphery 
relationship help us understand this. 
A standard way of analysing European decolonisation
26
  is 
to distinguish betwen international relations, the politics of the 
core and the politics of the colony, and to combine them to 
understand particular cases. (Darwin 1999) Here I take one 
element from each of these levels. 
The crucial feature of international relations was the 
balance of power between the USA and the USSR and the 
policies they pursued towards European empire. No 
generalisation is possible about how that worked out politically. 
What can be generalised is why demands for independence 
focused on specific colonial territories. These are often called 
“colonial states” and that phrase provides part of the 
explanation. “Colonial state” is a contradiction in terms if 
“state” signifies sovereignty and “colonial” dependency. Instead 
                                                 
26 The term itself is revealing, implying that the key agent was the imperial 
power, not the colonial nationalist movement. 
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the phrase identifies the colonial territory as a “state in waiting”. 
By 1945 the US State Department judged the Versailles 
settlement as fundamentally flawed. Justifying statehood on the 
basis of ethno-national identity set in motion a never ending 
chain of conflicts, sparking secessionist claims by “national 
minorities” and  irredentist claims by “incomplete states”. 
Conferring statehood on the “colonial state” apparently detached 
objective and universalist claims to equality and freedom from 
subjective, particularist claims based on ethnicity. The objection 
was that the new state was “artificial”, the implication being that 
“national identity” made a state “natural”.
27
  
The irony is that the “natural” states of post-1918 Europe 
were short-lived compared to the “artificial” states created after 
1945, most of which exist to this day. One could argue that this 
was a function of international, not domestic politics: after 1918 
numerous states engaged in conflict; after 1945 the Cold War 
froze the nation-state map. However, that still implies that other 
things matter more than “identity”. 
Such arguments are framed too generally. “Colonial state” 
might be an incoherent concept but some colonial territories 
acquired political identity through the ways in which imperial 
power and colonial society interacted. The British Raj had 
acquired aspects of quasi-statehood by the mid-1930s as Britain 
                                                 
27 To which one might reply that all states are “artificial” at the time of their 
creation; “natural” is how they come to be regarded if they endure. 
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conceded powers to the mass-mobilising Congress Party. 
Indeed, the reason why this was the major exception to the rule 
that the colonial state became the new nation-state was because 
the British lost control of colonial politics and conceded 
partition to two competing nationalist movements. 
The colonial political unit can become the framework 
within which “the new nation” is formed, as we have seen in 
north America. However, the extent to which this happens 
varies widely. At one extreme strong movements develop over 
several generations, as in India. At the other, an imperial power 
anxious to concede “independence” (because it has already lost 
power or concluded that the costs of rule far outweigh the 
benefits) chooses the colonial elites which take over. 
A similar analysis applies to the last major imperial 
collapse, the Soviet Union and east European communism. One 
did not need “state in waiting” legitimations with respect to 
Warsaw Pact states which were already recognised as sovereign 
nation-states. However, the constituent republics of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia  could be treated like European colonial 
states. The major difference was that in the USSR ethno-
nationality had been deliberately cultivated as the “national 
identity” of these republics, although with varying degrees of 
success.(Roeder 2007) 
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We now officially live in a world of nation-states. Empire 
has been proclaimed dead. If by empire we mean a formal 
structure of core and periphery, especially one with the national 
core which characterised modern empire, this seems valid. 
However, there is a great difference between nation-states which 
arose from an ex-imperial cores and ex-imperial peripheries. 
Apart from obvious inequalities of power between nation-states, 
nationalist ideology, nationalist politics and national sentiment 
vary widely. In certain ways we have returned to a world of pre-
modern empire where core and periphery are not formally 
defined with distinct modes of rule and a separation between 
core and periphery ideology. In other ways the predominance of 
modern infra-structural power means that domination and 
subordination can be exercised in ways which do not take the 
form of specialised institutions of coercion typical of modern 
overseas empire. Domination and subordination continue but the 
analytic tools developed both for pre-modern empire and the 
modern empire with a national core no longer suffice to 
understand this. 
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